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According to the theory of representative bureaucracy, passive representation among public em-ployees will lead to active representation in bureaucratic outputs. Existing research demonstratesthat the link between passive and active representation exists for race but not for sex. Past research
on this topic has not, however, taken into account the contextual environment that affects whether sex
will translate into gender and lead to active representation in the bureaucracy. In this paper, we create
a framework that specifies the conditions that affect whether passive representation results in active
representation for sex and then test this framework using the case of education. We find that passive
representation of women in education leads to active representation and that the institutional context
affects the extent to which this link between passive and active representation occurs.
The women’s movement has long sought to in-crease the number of women in leadershippositions within government organizations. An
assumption behind this goal is that increased access to
positions of power (passive representation) will result
in policies that improve the lives other women out-
side the organization (active representation). Is this
assumption valid? Little empirical research exists that
explores whether increasing the number of women in
an organization affects the policy outputs of the orga-
nization. What little research there is shows no link
between passive and active representation for gender
(Hindera 1993; Selden 1997).
In this article, we create a theoretical framework that
identifies the conditions under which gender diversity
has a substantive effect on organizational outputs and
tests whether the passive representation of women in
education affects the performance of female students.
Future researchers interested in diversity in other bu-
reaucracies, legislatures, or courts can use this frame-
work to explore whether diversity matters in different
organizations and across policy areas.
Our findings for whether passive representation of
women leads to active representation in education has
implications for public policies seeking to increase the
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diversity of organizations such as affirmative action.
If a link exists between passive and active represen-
tation for gender, then diversity, or the lack thereof,
has distributive consequences that go beyond the equal
opportunity of individual workers.
REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY
The literature on representative bureaucracy provides
a rich foundation for our research. The premise under-
lying this research is that a representative bureaucracy
is a good to be provided and that a bureaucracy broadly
reflective of the interests, opinions, needs, desires, and
values of the general public has a legitimate claim to
participate in the policy process (Selden 1997). The ex-
isting research distinguishes between passive and ac-
tive representation. Passive representation refers to
the bureaucracy’s demographic representativeness of
a larger population (Mosher 1982). Active represen-
tation, in contrast, is defined as bureaucrats’ advocacy
of their constituents’ interests, making policy decisions
that benefit a given group among the agency’s clientele,
often by eliminating discriminatory barriers (Hindera
1993; Mosher 1982). Our research is concerned with
understanding when passive representation leads to ac-
tive representation for women. We ask, in the language
of Hanna Pitkin (1967), When are female bureaucrats
merely “standing for” women and when might we ex-
pect them to “act for” women?
Most research on active representation focuses on
race and shows that minority bureaucrats frequently
implement policies or use their discretion to reduce the
disparate treatment minority clients have received his-
torically from various public bureaucracies (Hindera
1993; Meier et al. 1989; Meier and Stewart 1992; Selden
1997). In contrast, research examining representation
and the sex of the bureaucrats is limited and some-
what mixed in its results. The meager research that ex-
ists finds that passive representation for women clearly
affects individuals within organizations (Duerst-Lahti
and Johnson 1990; Kelly, Hale, and Burgess 1991) but
has not found evidence that passive representation
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results in active representation of women in bureau-
cratic outputs (Hindera 1993; Selden 1997). In sum,
prior research, sparse as it is, indicates that passive rep-
resentation can lead to active representation for race
but not for sex.
SEX, GENDER, AND IDENTIFICATION:
FEMINIST THEORY
We are intrigued by these findings that race is a sig-
nificantly more important factor than sex in affecting
bureaucrats’ actions and decisions. Surely sex is no less,
if no more, central in shaping individuals’ experiences
in the world and, hence, in shaping political values. Why,
then, would bureaucrats fail to translate passive repre-
sentation into active representation on the basis of sex?
Because representation is not a normal bureaucratic
function, we need to know when female bureaucrats
are likely to identify as women rather than as agency
employees or a myriad of other roles. The central role
of identity in representation logically leads us to work
in feminist theory.
Feminist theory suggests that part of the answer
to our question lies in the complicated relationship
among politics, group identity, and sexual difference.
As Simone de Beauvoir (1974, xxii) observed in 1949,
“Women do not say ‘We,’” for they lack a distinctive
history, culture, or religion that both marks them off as
a collective with internal similarities and differentiates
them from others of their social class. In many ways, the
history of second-wave feminism in the United States
confirms de Beauvoir’s point, for in the very process of
articulating a feminist “We” through the practices of
consciousness raising, feminists were confronted with
the wide range of markers of difference that distinguish
women from one another: race, class, sexuality—the list
could go on and on. Could it be that, as some feminists
have suggested, women compose a social collective de-
finable only by recourse to a common biological sex
(Daly 1978; O’Brien 1989)?
Defining women according to (supposed) biological
similarities that remain constant over time runs afoul,
however, of another foundational premise of second-
wave feminist thought: the important distinction be-
tween sex and gender. Insofar as sex refers simply to
the physiological reproductive capacities, gender de-
scribes the social and cultural interpretation of sex or,
more precisely, the cultural magnification of sexual dif-
ference and commensurate suppression of similarities
between women and men (Rubin 1975). The concept
of gender helps feminists challenge limitations that are
socially imposed upon women, limitations that are jus-
tified by reference to ascriptive characteristics said to
follow from biological maleness or femaleness but that
differ demonstrably across cultures, social classes, and
historical eras. Put differently, gender evokes the social
conventions that claim biological sex as their natural
origin, marking the difference (for example) between
biological femaleness and what counts as feminine in
any given time or place. If sex is described as a binary
variable (male or female), gender is more accurately
thought of as designating a limitless range of possi-
ble interpretations of sex that coexist within a given
society.1
SEX, GENDER, AND INSTITUTIONS
Our examination of feminist theory convinces us that
the classic social scientists’ variable of “sex,” crucial
as it is to any inquiry measuring the social distinc-
tions between women and men, is simply not nuanced
enough to capture fully the complexity of gender. Gen-
der, not sex, is what matters for the purposes of social
research (Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 1995), for it is the
considerably more complicated concept of gender that
tracks the political–institutional meanings that make
“sex” socially relevant. By extracting “sex” from gen-
der to distinguish female from male, scholars dispense
with precisely what makes gender important to social
science research—social meaning—and endow sexual
difference with a constant and invariant quality that
much feminist thinking about social identification and
political action shows to be problematic. Of course, this
presents something of a problem for social scientists,
who, for the time being anyway, may be hard pressed
to reconfigure their data so as to encode a schema more
complicated than the stark binary, male/female, allows
us to imagine. But this is not reason enough to abandon
the effort to rethink how we treat gender, or processes
of identification more generally, in empirical work. Cer-
tainly researchers can make data tell a more complex
story about gender even when they are limited by the
binaries of their data; and we suggest that a large part
of that project is entailed in the process of interpreting
the data or, more precisely, interpreting data in light of
the larger institutional features that shape the circum-
stances in which bureaucrats exercise discretion and
act to affect policy outcomes, in other words, in the
ways that female bureaucrats identify as women and
translate passive into active representation.
In this respect, some of the conceptual contributions
of the new institutionalism are useful; this literature
can focus our concern with processes of identification
by reference to the possibilities opened and foreclosed
by institutions themselves and, thus, help us to hone
1 Butler (1990) complicated this distinction between sex and gen-
der. Exclusive attention to the ways in which men and women are
formed through gender socialization left sex itself undertheorized
and relatively unproblematized. Butler contends that many feminists
continue to assume a more or less symmetrical relationship between
sex and gender, even as they insist upon the differences between
them. If gender is distinct from sex, she suggests, there is no reason
to suppose that gender follows from sex, that is, there is no reason
to assume that femininity will attach itself exclusively (or even pri-
marily) to female bodies, or masculinity to male bodies. Calling into
question the binary character of both sex and gender, Butler argues
that sex is subject to the same historical and cultural forces as gender,
with the consequence that sex is itself a gendered category. Gender
is quite clearly historical, a property not of bodies but of practices
that accrue meaning and gain purchase through a regulated series
of repetitions that attain the virtual status of institution. Sex is not
prior to gender—it is not the natural foundation from which social
forces construct gender—but another product of the same practices
that constitute gender, testifying to their institutional power.
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in on the institutional contexts in which identifica-
tion is crystallized, enacted, sustained, contested, and
transformed.2 Institutions work as “ligatures” that fas-
ten competing and cooperating sites of political analy-
sis (the state, the economy, and civil society) together
with relationships among political actors and large-
scale processes (Katznelson 1997, 103). Political agents,
including bureaucrats, are always embedded in institu-
tional milieus; they are both shaped and constrained
by the contingencies of context and circumstance
(Immergut 1998; Katznelson 1997); and public policy
is also influenced by the complex, often competing,
dynamics fostered by the interaction of institutions
(Orren and Skowronek 1994). Even more significant
for our purposes here, institutions shape social actors’
cognition by conferring identity—that is, by selecting
the factors that are to be considered relevant in mak-
ing decisions.3 As Douglas (1986, 59) states, “Sameness
[read identity] is not a quality that can be recognized in
things themselves; it is conferred upon elements within
a coherent scheme” worked out by institutions for in-
stitutional purposes and political ends.
Social institutions are important sites where sex-
ual difference comes to be defined as salient to social
identity, for they are the locations where gendered
practices develop and are repeated, adapted, and some-
times transformed. Institutional structure is particu-
larly important in shaping the behavior of individuals
who work in bureaucracies because bureaucracies are
not generally designed to serve a representative func-
tion for a particular clientele group. Institutional struc-
tures help to determine the purpose and scope of
bureaucrats’ work and how much discretion they have
in carrying out their tasks. Hierarchy, control of in-
formation, standard operating procedures, and roles
all work to keep individual behavior in line with the
goals of the bureaucracy (Simon 1997). We cannot un-
derstand bureaucratic behavior without taking into ac-
count the institutions in which the behavior takes place.
The power of bureaucracies to constrain individual
behavior works against active representation because
individuals engaging in an advocacy role within the
organization must overcome institutional constraints
to identify with clients who share their demographic
characteristics (Meier 1993a). Institutional structures
in the organization can work to highlight identity with
the organization (Romzek 1990) and, in so doing, de-
emphasize identity based on demographic character-
2 In more traditional public administration terms, identity is simi-
lar to what organizational theorists termed “role.” The multiple and
changing identities of an individual bureaucrat are similar to Simon’s
(1997, 158) contention that “an individual can assume a variety of
roles when these are evoked by appropriate circumstances, each of
which may interact only weakly with the others.” See also Brudney
et al. 2000.
3 For example, when an academic department is required to report
the demographic distribution of its faculty according sex and race,
distinctions of maleness or femaleness, and white or black, become
salient. But when the same department is contracting with a caterer
for its annual retirement banquet, other markers of difference—
such as eating habits that distinguish vegetarians from carnivores—
emerge as differences that matter.
istics. According to Ferguson (1984, 18), hierarchy
and roles in bureaucratic settings cause bureaucrats
to de-emphasize their multiple identities and to in-
crease the importance of their identity as members of
the organization. Not surprisingly, research has found
that the best predictor of bureaucratic attitudes is the
agency for which an individual works, not his/her demo-
graphic characteristics (Meier and Nigro 1976; Mosher
1982).
Although institutional structure plays a large role in
constraining the behavior of individuals working within
it, bureaucracies cannot completely determine and con-
trol individual practices. Even with the power of hier-
archy, managers of bureaucracies cannot completely
circumscribe their subordinates’ activities due to in-
formation asymmetry and goal conflict (Brehm and
Gates 1997; Moe 1984). In fact, institutional structures
and the individuals who inhabit the institution have a
symbiotic relationship. The preferences and attitudes
of individual bureaucrats work to shape institutional
structures such as standard operating procedures and
norms (Barnard 1938; Brudney et al. 2000).
Institutions supply the social context and meaning
that marks the distinction between gender and sex. In-
sofar as a considerable body of feminist research in the
social sciences demonstrates that gender plays an im-
portant role in shaping individual experience and per-
spective (Chodorow 1978; Gilligan 1982; Keller 1985;
Young 1990), it stands to reason that bureaucratic in-
stitutions, too, are both the subjects and the objects of
gendered practices: Institutions are the products of gen-
dered behavior as well as the environment in which that
behavior takes place and is (or can be) transformed.
While feminist scholars contend that gender matters,
then, it is important to add that institutions matter as
well, for it is within institutions that sex accrues so-
cial meaning and, thus, through institutional practices
that gender becomes politically salient. Put differently,
institutional, and institutionalized, practices constitute
gender, and constitute gender as both mutable and
malleable, shaping the circumstances in which a sub-
ject’s political consciousness might crystallize around
the question of gender and she might act to promote
causes and interests associated with women. In short,
attending to institutional contexts can help us develop
richer interpretations of data that are otherwise limited
by binary coding according to sex. Doing so enables us
to develop a more nuanced understanding of how and
when gender matters, of how and under what condi-
tions female bureaucrats are likely to translate passive
into active representation.
The null finding that there is no link between pas-
sive and active representation with respect to gender
is flawed because it does not explicitly incorporate the
institutional and political context of the bureaucratic
experience into empirical analysis. The important ques-
tion facing us is not necessarily whether passive gender
representation leads to active representation, but un-
der what conditions this link occurs (Kelly and Newman
2001)? In what follows we create a template that can be
used to identify cases when we should expect passive
representation to lead to active representation.
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FACTORS THAT FACILITATE ACTIVE
REPRESENTATION FOR GENDER
Because institutional and political contexts matter, we
should not expect active representation to occur in the
case of gender across all bureaucratic settings. Past em-
pirical tests of representative bureaucracy for sex, how-
ever, have paid little attention to identifying the context
in which bureaucrats’ gender identity plays a promi-
nent role in how they perform their work.4 We seek to
fill this gap in the literature by creating a framework
that will identify cases where active representation is
likely to occur and use this framework to generate and
test hypotheses concerning the impact of gender rep-
resentation on the bureaucratic outputs of education
bureaucracies.
Two necessary, but not sufficient, conditions exist
for active bureaucratic representation to occur. First,
bureaucrats must have discretion in how they carry
out their jobs. In bureaucracies where most decisions
are dictated by rules, bureaucrats have few opportu-
nities to shape outputs to reward a particular group
(Meier 1993a). Second, a necessary condition for rep-
resentative bureaucracy concerns the type of policy the
organization produces. Researchers argue that for rep-
resentative bureaucracy to occur, the policy issue must
be salient to the demographic characteristic in question
(Meier 1993a; Selden 1997). Certain policy outputs are
salient to demographic characteristics such as gender,
while other issues may not be. This definition does lit-
tle, however, to help us differentiate the issues that are
women’s issues from those that are not.5
Intuitively we all can identify issues that have been
defined as “women’s issues.” Intuition does little, how-
ever, to help us systematically identify policy issues that
foster representative bureaucracy. As a group, women
may have a distinct viewpoint on many policy issues,
but they do not always do so. The content of women’s
issues is fluid and changes over time. It is not a constant
(compare Dolan 2000 and Meier and Nigro 1976).
The fluid nature of what counts as women’s issues
makes it difficult, therefore, to identify a priori the
issues for which we expect to find representative bu-
reaucracy for gender unless we more clearly specify the
necessary conditions for an issue to become gendered.6
We argue that a policy area can become gendered (1)
because the policy directly benefits women as a class,
(2) because the gender of the bureaucrat changes the
4 Researchers have begun to focus on the interaction between in-
stitutional structure and representative bureaucracy (see Kelly and
Newman 2001). Thus far, work in this area has not systematically
identified the conditions that are necessary and those that are suffi-
cient for representative bureaucracy for gender to exist.
5 The terms gender and women are not synonymous. The paucity
of representation of women in organizations does not make gen-
der unimportant. Organizations without female representation are
gendered to privilege the masculine. Because, historically, women
have not been represented in organizations, gender diversity should
give organizations a more “female” orientation. Therefore we are
interested in issues salient to women as opposed to men. We refer to
these issues as “gendered.”
6 Even though both men and women have gender, by “gendered” we
mean made more relevant to women.
client–bureaucrat relationship, or (3) because the issue
has been defined as a women’s issue through the polit-
ical process.7
The most straightforward way to identify a women’s
issue is to determine whether the policy directly bene-
fits women as a group as distinct from men. Policies such
as equal pay and funding for women’s health directly
benefit women as a class. As such, they provide bureau-
crats an opportunity to play a representative role by
distributing benefits to women or by increasing overall
benefits.
The second way of identifying gender-salient issues
is by exploring whether the gender of the bureaucrat
influences the client–bureaucratic relationship. This is
most important in street-level bureaucracies where the
interaction between bureaucrat and client is crucial
in determining policy outputs. When bureaucrats and
clients share the same demographic characteristic, they
often share the same life experiences (Thielemann and
Stewart 1996). Some life experiences are shared by
women and, for the most part, not shared by men. In
the case of rape, for example, female victims may feel
more comfortable working with female law enforce-
ment bureaucrats, who may be more likely to respond
productively and sympathetically.
In addition, women can have distinct perspectives
on many policies that benefit not only women, but also
children and men (social welfare policies for example).
Research has found that gender matters to broader pol-
icy areas that do not benefit women exclusively, such as
the use of force in foreign or domestic affairs, income
redistribution, and consumer concerns (Hale and Kelly
1989). The political process of issue definition is such
that an issue may be defined one way during one histori-
cal period but take on another meaning at another time
in response to the work of social movements and in-
terest group pressure (Rochefort and Cobb 1994). For
example, in industrialized nations, certain kinds of pol-
icy concerns—pay equity, reproductive rights, domestic
violence, child care, etc.—are perceived as women’s is-
sues, largely because these have been targeted by femi-
nists as venues where the social construction of gender
places women at a distinct disadvantage (in assigning
to them primary responsibility for child care, for exam-
ple) or subjects them to systematic discrimination. Such
issues represent only a small portion of public policy
matters that might, in different circumstances, come to
be viewed as having a distinctive impact on women.8
We hypothesize that active representation will occur
only in bureaucracies dealing with policy issues that
7 Of course behavior will vary among female bureaucrats. Not all
women will take up the role of active representation even when an
issue is gendered.
8 Selden’s (1997) finding that passive representation does not lead
to active representation for women is not surprising given the fact
that the issue she studied, housing for farmers, is not a particularly
gendered issue. The needs of farmers have not been on the feminist
political agenda, nor do gender differences exist in public opinion
concerning agricultural policy. Furthermore, the lack of high numbers
of single female farmers make it unlikely that a street-level bureau-
crat will feel that she can advocate for women by increasing aid to
farmers.
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directly benefit women as a class, gendered policy issues
and issues where the bureaucrats’ gender identification
changes the client–bureaucrat relationship.
Other institutional and contextual factors such as
the mission of a given bureaucracy should influence
the transfer of passive into active representation. Some
bureaucracies create advocacy roles for bureaucrats in
keeping with organizational missions (Selden 1997) by
socializing individual bureaucrats to adopt organiza-
tional goals (March and Olson 1994; Romzek 1990;
Simon 1947). If the bureaucracy has a mission of assist-
ing a particular group, passive representation should
lead seamlessly to active representation. Although bu-
reaucrats who do not share the demographic charac-
teristics of their clientele should also act as advocates
(Downs 1966), those who do share the demographic
characteristic(s) should be easier to incorporate into
the agency’s goals as a consequence of their common
demographic predispositions toward these goals. We
hypothesize that although mission is not a necessary
condition, passive representation in terms of gender
might be expected to lead to active representation when
the leaders of the bureaucracy or the bureaucracy’s
historical mission focus on assisting women. Active
representation will increase as passive representation
increases in agencies with an advocacy mission but
will not be as strong in agencies lacking this advocacy
mission.9
Similar to mission, hierarchy will affect whether fe-
male bureaucrats become advocates. Some scholars
argue that hierarchy by its very nature precludes rep-
resentative bureaucracy. They argue that hierarchi-
cal organizations depersonalize relationships, making
members less likely to identify with a group outside
of the organization (Ferguson 1984). According to this
line of thinking, hierarchical organizations cannot be
feminist organizations (Firestone 1970; Gelb 1986).
Accordingly, we should expect bureaucratic organiza-
tions to maintain the status quo even as they increase
passive representation. We hypothesize that more hier-
archical and centralized organizations will be less likely
to link passive and active representation.
Although hierarchy in and of itself may weaken the
link between passive and active representation, the
Weberian view of bureaucracy suggests that the exis-
tence of hierarchy per se is less important than the ques-
tion of who occupies the top of any hierarchy. Hierarchy
gives control to those bureaucrats at the top of the or-
ganizational structure (Weber 1946). By this reasoning,
when women gain access to upper levels of an organiza-
tion, they should create an internal environment more
conducive to representative advocacy. Researchers
have found that stratification affects representative bu-
reaucracy for race (Meier, Stewart, and England 1989).
We hypothesize that as the number of women in su-
9 We believe that the historic lack of mission for advocating for
women in the EEOC helps to explain the failure of passive repre-
sentation to lead to active representation that Hindera (1993) finds
in his analysis of EEOC activity in the 1980s. In future research we
will explore this further.
pervisory positions increases, active representation will
increase.
In addition, organizational theorists have argued that
a numerical threshold is necessary for passive to be
transformed into active representation (Meier 1993b;
Thompson 1978). A critical mass may be needed for
minorities to take an advocacy role (Kanter 1977). This
leads to our next hypothesis: Organizations with a crit-
ical mass of women will be more likely to allow for
active representation.
Professionalization also influences bureaucratic out-
puts. Professions compete with the bureaucracy in
shaping individual bureaucrats’ goals because profes-
sionals receive some of their rewards from a group
outside of the bureaucracy. Incorporating professionals
into bureaucracies incorporates their values into the
bureaucracy (Eisner 1991; Hodges and Durant 1989;
Meier 2000). If professionals who see advocacy for a
particular group as their role dominate a bureaucracy,
we should expect bureaucratic outputs to be distributed
to benefit that group. Similar to mission, professional-
ization should affect all bureaucrats, not just female
ones. However, because women may be more disposed
toward engaging in active representation for women
due to shared experience, we believe that greater pro-
fessionalization will facilitate the translation of passive
representation into active representation.10
This section has hypothesized that seven insti-
tutional/contextual factors affect the transformation
of passive representation into active representation:
discretion, the gendering of a given policy issue,
mission/socialization, hierarchy, stratification, critical
mass, and professionalization. Although active repre-
sentation should not occur in any organization without
discretion and a gendered policy issue, the influence
of other factors will become more or less important
depending on the specific organization studied.
THE EMPIRICAL CASE
Our neoinstitutional theory of representative bureau-
cracy and gender links the processes of identification
with the representation of clientele. This section de-
scribes our empirical test of the theory using schools
and educational performance. Looking at education
systems, we examine how female math teachers affect
female students’ math scores and subsequently influ-
ence student aspirations. Any movement from the more
general theory to specific tests of the theory will in-
evitably narrow the range of variation; in some cases,
variables will become constants (that is, when a single
type of agency is investigated, mission becomes a con-
stant) or their variation will be truncated.
Theoretical Modifications
For bureaucratic representation to occur, the issue in-
volved must be identified as a gendered one. Among the
10 Women may be more attracted to professions where advocacy is
possible, such as social work or teaching.
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most constant gender issues in education is that of math
scores. Nationwide, a persistent gender gap exists, with
girls scoring lower than boys on math tests (Strauss and
Subotnik 1994). Performance on standardized math
tests is in turn associated with continuing one’s educa-
tion, especially in fields that emphasize math or math-
ematical reasoning (Oakes 1990; Wilson and Boldizar
1990). Insofar as identifying an issue as gendered is a
necessary environmental condition for representation,
the matter of improving girls’ math scores meets the
standard of benefiting women as a class. By selecting the
same type of agencies (schools) during the same time
frame (1995–98), we have turned many of the other
factors, including mission, into constants.
Within the organization, a second necessary con-
dition for representative bureaucracy is that the
bureaucrats in question have discretion to influence
outcomes. This paper focuses on street-level bureau-
crats: teachers, both female teachers in general and fe-
male math teachers in particular. The normal principal
(in both senses of the term)–agent relationship pro-
vides greater advantages to the agent (i.e., the teacher)
than in most other organizations. School systems vest a
great deal of autonomy in these street-level personnel
who come to the organization as trained professionals.
Administrators only rarely visit individual classrooms
and, thus, do not closely monitor the interactions be-
tween teacher and student. Administrative control is
limited to issues such as textbooks used, whether lesson
plans were filed, and access to instructional resources.
While these are important factors, they have only mod-
est effects on how a teacher conducts a class.
With this discretion female teachers could affect the
math grades of female students in one of four ways.11
First, female teachers aware of the math gap might
spend additional time with and generate more positive
reinforcement for girls when teaching math. Second,
girls who do not have a female math teacher could
still identify with one as a role model; this identifica-
tion could result in a greater effort to succeed in math
classes. Third, nonmath teachers might facilitate learn-
ing by encouraging students who run into difficulty.
Although math teachers are in a better position to pro-
vide this encouragement, a student might identify more
closely with another teacher with a different specializa-
tion. This might be specific and linked to math classes
or general and linked to overall aspirations. Some of
this influence could work through an informal advising
process, or might require no personal contact at all.
Fourth, female teachers may be more likely than male
teachers to press schools to adopt policies that will
encourage girls in fields where they have historically
underperformed. Although there is evidence that both
male and female teachers call on boys more often, allow
boys to dominate classroom discussion, push boys for
more information, and expect more from male students
(Campbell 1991; Fennema and Leder 1990; Sadker and
Sadker 1994), there is evidence that in math and sci-
11 There is a fifth possibility. Because schools operate in a segmented
labor market, female math teachers might simply be better teachers
(see Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999).
ence classrooms female teachers act as role models,
enhance female students’ performance, and warm the
“chilly climate”(Angrist and Almquist 1975; Rothstein
1995; Stake and Granger 1978). Only one of these four
methods of influence requires that an individual stu-
dent come into contact with a specific math teacher in a
classroom; the other three processes can work through-
out the organization. This diffuseness of impact means
that it must be studied at the organizational rather than
the individual level.12 Accordingly, schools serve as the
units of analysis.
Within the organization, two of our institutional
variables remain relevant—stratification and hierar-
chy; the other three are essentially constant across
organizations—professionalization and socialization—
or operate at well above minimum levels—critical mass.
Hierarchically, school systems are extremely flat orga-
nizations with discretion vested in street-level person-
nel. Despite the general flat structure, school districts
vary, with some being more decentralized. Our mea-
sure of decentralization is the span of control at the
street level, that is, the ratio of the number of teach-
ers to the total number of administrators in the or-
ganization. As this variable increases, administrators
supervise more teachers, with the logical result that
the time available to supervise any one teacher will
decline. The mean span is 14, with a standard deviation
of five.
Despite the preference for flat organizational forms,
school districts are highly stratified by sex and can
be considered classic glass-ceiling organizations. Fully
75% of teachers in Texas schools are female, but
only 27% of supervisors (principals, assistant princi-
pals, and assistant superintendents) and only 8.4%
of superintendents are. These data provide us with
a measure of stratification—the percentage of female
administrators.
The concept of a critical mass plays a role when any
group has limited access to the organization (see Kanter
1977; Meier 1993b). Both female teachers (75%) and
female math teachers (68%) constitute a majority of
their classification. These figures should be well above
what constitutes a critical mass, thus rendering the con-
cept inapplicable for teachers (but not for administra-
tors, see below).
In general terms, both professionalization and so-
cialization should be relatively similar across these
organizations. Teachers have a common educational
background, and they serve a general instructional role
within the organization. Individual schools of educa-
tion might make a teacher more aware of gender issues,
and some schools might encourage the development
of a representation role; however, data on these factors
are not available. In general, the professionalization
and socialization of individuals across these organiza-
tions should be more similar than different.
12 Analysis at the individual level might also miss influences that
persist through time. If the impact of an individual teacher persists,
then studies conducted in later years are unlikely to capture that
influence.
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The Texas Case
Our specific case is 607 Texas high schools from 1995
to 1998. Because many of the data exist only at the
district level, we were able to move our unit of anal-
ysis to the school level by restricting the analysis to
single high school districts (we replicated this analysis
with data at the district level and found similar results).
Except for the eighth grade math test, all data were
measured at the high school level. The Texas case pro-
vides an ideal setting for our study for two reasons.
First, Texas has statewide standardized tests and an
elaborate database that permits analysis by sex. Sec-
ond, the Texas set of schools is extremely diverse in
terms of race, ethnicity, resources, urban location, and
other factors that affect education performance. The
diversity of these schools suggests that findings from
Texas should also apply to other educational systems
as well as to organizations with similar characteristics
(highly professionalized organizations with discretion
vested in street-level bureaucrats). If Texas differs from
other states, it is because educational performance has
consistently been a salient issue for the past 15 years
and because expenditures have increased more rapidly
in Texas than in the nation as a whole.
Dependent Variables
Texas requires standardized tests of all students in
grades 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 as well as an exit exam. Our
first dependent variables are the percentage of female
students who pass the math exams in grade 8 and the
exit exam. The literature suggests that math scores di-
verge only in junior and senior high when girls face the
choice between lipstick and logarithms (Fennema and
Sherman 1977; Meece and Parsons 1982; Oakes 1990;
Strauss and Subotnik 1994). In Texas, boys’ and girls’
math scores are essentially the same in grades 3 through
8, but boys’ pass rates exceed girls’ by 4.1 percentage
points on the exit exam.
Performance on standardized tests is a hurdle along
the way to educational achievement. Students who per-
form poorly on such exams may also perform poorly
on others or might reduce their overall educational
aspirations. To investigate these phenomena in the
context of representative bureaucracy, four other de-
pendent variables are examined—average SAT scores,
average ACT scores, the percentage of students who
score above 1110 on the SAT or its equivalent on the
ACT, and the successful completion of advanced place-
ment exams (for which college credit is given). Girls in
Texas score higher than boys on the ACT (16.8 vs. 15.2)
and are more likely to pass advanced placement classes
(15.7% vs. 14.1%) but score well below boys on SAT
exams (933 vs. 962) and are less likely to break the 1,110
standard (16.8% vs. 18.3%). The lower SAT scores are
not a function of more girls taking the test; correlations
between the number of test takers and the average
scores approach 0 when more than 30% of students
take the exam. The correlation in this data set where
46% of students take the SAT is only 0.08, and that
disappears with a control for poverty.
Control Variables
In addition to the key independent variables (female
math teachers or female teachers, hierarchy and strat-
ification), two sets of controls are used—one set for
the task difficulty facing the organization and the other
for organizational resources. Task difficulty reflects the
truism that some students are easier to educate than
others. The literature consistently finds that poverty
and race are correlated with greater education prob-
lems (Jencks and Phillips 1998). Poverty and race are
associated both with a lack of educational resources
in the home and with other factors (e.g., single-family
households) that affect student learning. The three spe-
cific measures are the percentage of black students, the
percentage of Latino students, and the percentage of
poor students (measured as students eligible for free
school lunch programs). Each of these control variables
should be negatively related to student performance.
The relationship between resources and student per-
formance is controversial (Hanushek 1996; Hedges and
Greenwald 1996). Recent research using well-crafted
longitudinal data sets and well-designed experiments,
however, generally shows that additional resources are
associated with higher student performance (Evans,
Murray, and Schwab 1997; Wenglinsky 1997). Two mea-
sures of resources are included—average teacher salary
and average class size. Teacher salaries should be pos-
itively related to student performance, and class size
should be negatively related to performance.13
Because our data are pooled (four years and 607
schools), we also include a set of control variables to
deal with the time series aspect of the data set. Dummy
variables for individual years were included in each
equation. These dummy variables were always jointly
significant, reflecting the overall positive trends in the
student performance. To deal with the other source of
problems related to pools, we assessed the cross sec-
tions of each equation for heteroscedasticity. Levels of
heteroscedasticity were modest, and using robust stan-
dard errors had little impact on the findings presented
here.
FINDINGS
The two regressions for girls’ math scores are given in
Table 1. The results are consistent with expectations.
Female math teachers are positively associated with
girls’ math scores in grade 8 and on the exit exam. For
grades 3, 5, and 6 the relationships are not statistically
different from zero (results not shown). These find-
ings are consistent with the literature that finds that
sex differences in math performance do not arise until
junior high. At lower grade levels where there are no
sex differences, the sex of math teachers appears to
be irrelevant.14 In junior high and senior high, female
13 We also estimated these equations using median family income and
percentage of the population living in poverty. Neither variable was
statistically significant in the presence of the other control variables.
Including these variables did not affect the other relationships found.
14 The lack of relationship at the elementary levels makes sense also
given the key independent variable—math teachers. Math teachers
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TABLE 1. Female Math Teachers and Girls’ Math Scores: Dependent Variable = Percentage of
Girls Passing the Math Test
Exit Exam Grade 8
Independent Variable Slope Error t Slope Error t
Female math teachers 0.055 0.013 4.09 0.053 0.013 4.08
Black student percentage ¡0:288 0.027 10.78 ¡0:272 0.026 10.56
Latino student percentage ¡0:115 0.018 6.47 ¡0:105 0.017 6.12
Low-income student percentage ¡0:142 0.026 5.51 ¡0:205 0.025 8.19
Teachers’ salaries (000) 0.768 0.137 5.62 0.747 0.131 5.69
Class size ¡1:053 0.147 7.17 ¡0:971 0.142 6.86
Adjusted R2 .35 .51
F 145.20 281.62
SE 12.69 12.27
N of cases 2,414 2,427
Note: Coefficients for annual dummy variables not included. All relationships significant at p < :0001.
math teachers are associated with higher math scores
for girls even when controlling for other factors.
On the math exit exam, a one percentage point in-
crease in female math teachers is associated with a 0.055
percentage point increase in the girls’ pass rate, all other
things being equal. While this appears to be a relatively
modest relationship, in fact, a one-standard deviation
change in the percentage of female math teachers is
associated with a change equivalent to 25% of the gap
between boys’ and girls’ math scores. While the sex of
math teachers is clearly not the most important fac-
tor in math education, reductions of this size would be
substantively important and well worth pursuing.15 The
control variables’ relationships are all consistent with
expectations.
Representation is a process that should be affected
by institutional factors. In this case, both hierarchy
and stratification vary. Female math teachers should
be most likely to act in ways to benefit female students
in organizations with low levels of hierarchy and high
numbers of female administrators.
Table 2 examines the math exit exam and splits our
districts according to the key institutional variables
(we split the data rather than use interaction effects
to avoid the massive collinearity generated by interac-
are a certified designation that applies only to secondary school
teachers. Elementary school teachers are certified only as elementary
school teachers unless they have a specialization such as special ed-
ucation or bilingual education. Math is not a designated elementary
certification in Texas. In short, math teachers are unlikely to affect
math scores when there are no “math” teachers.
15 The 25% figure would hold if boys were not affected by having
a woman math teacher. In fact, boys’ scores are also improved by
having a woman math teacher but not as much as girls’ scores are.
This means that the gap would not close this quickly. The illustration
is provided as a way of judging the substantive size of the impact,
not on closing the gap per se. The impact of female math teachers
on boys’ scores is an important issue substantively and theoretically.
When boys’ scores on any of the indicators are included in these
models, the results are weaker but generally hold up. We present
the models without boys’ scores because our theory contends that
representation will generate benefits for the represented clientele;
it does not argue that the represented will benefit more than other
clientele.
tion terms). Regressions are run for hierarchical and
nonhierarchical organizations (span of control greater
than 14) and for organizations with more and less fe-
male administrators (25% cut point).16 Our institu-
tional hypothesis is that the impact of female math
teachers should increase (that is, the regression coeffi-
cient should increase) in flat organizations and in orga-
nizations with more female administrators. The results
are mixed. The teachers’ slope increases for flat or-
ganizations, but the difference is not statistically sig-
nificant. For female administrators the relationship is
statistically significant, but the difference is in the
wrong direction. These mixed findings may be ex-
plained by the nature of math instruction, which is
highly specific and rife with discretion. Organizations
may be likely to find it difficult to modify a process that
is characterized by extremely high levels of information
asymmetry and few opportunities for observation.
Although math exams are a relatively narrow slice
of public school curricula, they have long-term impli-
cations for building human capital. Table 3 relates math
exit exams to average SAT scores (the verbal and math
total; individual tests are not available). Several find-
ings are relevant. First, math exit scores are positively
correlated with SAT scores; all things equal, a one-
percentile increase in the pass rate is associated with a
0.95 point increase on the SAT (about 15.8 points for a
one-standard deviation change). Second, math teach-
ers affect SAT scores only indirectly via their impact
on the math exam. Third, female teachers in general,
however, are associated with a substantial increase in
female SAT scores; a one-percentile increase in female
teachers is associated with an increase of 2.0 points on
the SAT (about 17 points for a one standard deviation
change), all other things equal.
The results in Table 3 suggest a slight change in fo-
cus to female teachers in general and to indicators of
16 We use 25% as a threshold effect for administrators based on
Meier’s (1993b) empirical estimates for race rather than Kanter’s
(1977) theoretical estimate of 15%. The use of 25% also divides the
sample more evenly.
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TABLE 2. Female Math Teachers and Girls’ Math Scores: Dependent Variable = Percentage of
Girls Passing the Math Exit Exam
Stratification,
Hierarchy Female Managers
Independent Variable Low High Few Many
Female math teachers 0.065 0.052 0.078 0.025
(3.34) (2.69) (3.91) (1.24)
Black student percentage ¡0:249 ¡0:316 ¡0:307 ¡0:258
(7.90) (6.81) (6.20) (7.94)
Latino student percentage ¡0:085 ¡0:128 ¡0:123 ¡0:099
(3.84) (4.44) (3.85) (4.32)
Low-income student percentage ¡0:184 ¡0:115 ¡0:119 ¡0:178
(5.92) (2.64) (2.45) (5.57)
Teachers’ salaries (000) 0.621 0.988 0.909 0.489
(3.49) (4.59) (3.93) (2.62)
Class size ¡1:135 ¡0:693 ¡1:069 ¡0:897
(5.90) (2.74) (4.18) (4.48)
Adjusted R2 .44 .28 .31 .40
F 114.50 45.26 50.04 87.53
SE 10.88 14.57 13.45 11.78
N of cases 1,300 1,075 983 1,153
Note: Coefficients for annual dummy variables not included. All relationships significant at p < :05 except female math teachers.
Stratification: more than 25% women managers.
TABLE 3. Specific Versus General Impacts: Math Teachers and Other Teachers: Dependent
Variable = Girls’ SAT Exam Scores
Independent Variable Slope Error t Score
Female math teachers ¡0:007 0.106 ¡0:06
Female teachers 2.003 0.384 5.22*
Math exit exam scores 0.952 0.136 6.99*
Black student percentage 0.070 0.162 0.43
Latino student percentage ¡0:045 0.112 0.40
Low-income student percentage ¡1:239 0.163 7.62*
Teachers’ salaries (000) 5.172 0.862 5.96*
Class size 1.104 1.010 1.09
Adjusted R2 .50
F 150.09
SE 62.77
N of cases 1,657
Note: Coefficients for annual dummy variables not included. ⁄ p < :05.
college aspirations. Because the influence of female
teachers is likely to be diffused through out the or-
ganization, the institutional factors in our theory—
hierarchy and stratification—in this case, are also more
likely to come into play. The next two tables examine
SAT scores, ACT scores, high exam scores, and passing
advanced placement exams and how the relationships
between these variables and female teachers are struc-
tured by hierarchy and stratification. Again, our work-
ing hypothesis is that the influence of female teachers
will be enhanced in decentralized organizations and or-
ganizations with women in positions of administrative
authority.
Table 4 shows how hierarchy interacts with female
teachers to affect female student performance. The sec-
ond column of the table shows that female teachers are
positively associated with outcomes for female students
on all four indicators. With regard to the interaction
with structure, our hypothesis is that women teachers
will have a greater impact in relatively flat organizations
(those with a span of control over more than 14). In
flatter organizations, a one-percentage point increase in
female faculty is associated with a 3.36-point gain on the
SAT, substantially more than the corresponding 0.85-
point gain for more hierarchical organizations. Simi-
larly for ACT scores, the slope for female teachers is
more than three times higher in flat organizations than
in the others. At the high end of the scale, that is, scores
above 1,110 on the SAT or its ACT equivalent, a one-
percentile increase in female teachers correlates with a
0.37-percentage point increase in high-performing stu-
dents in flat organizations; in other organizations, the
relationship is essentially zero. Finally, the strongest
comparison exists for advanced placement classes. A
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TABLE 4. Institutions and Representative Bureaucracy: The Case of Hierarchy
All Schools Hierarchy
Dependent Variable Slope t Score Low Slope High Slope t Scorea Probability
SAT scores 2.215 6.38 3.359 0.848 5.46 <0:001
ACT scores 0.061 2.25 0.091 0.025 1.98 .024
Above criterion
(1,100 SAT equivalent) 0.144 3.22 0.373 ¡0:033 6.62 <0:001
Advanced placement 0.504 5.88 0.892 0.015 10.23 <0:001
Note: All equations control for percentage black students, percentage Latino students, percentage low-income students, class size,
teachers’ salaries, and annual dummy variables. at test for difference in slope.
TABLE 5. Institutions and Representative Bureaucracy: The Case of Stratification
All Schools Women Managers
Dependent Variable Slope t Score 20%C <20% t Test Probability
SAT scores 2.215 6.38 2.745 1.801 1.91 .028
ACT scores 0.061 2.25 0.088 0.032 1.40 .081
Above criterion
(1,110 SAT equivalent) 0.144 3.22 0.202 0.043 2.46 .006
Advanced placement 0.504 5.88 0.665 0.120 3.68 <0:001
Note: All equations control for percentage black students, percentage Latino students, percentage low-income students, class size,
teachers’ salaries, and annual dummy variables.
one-percentage point increase in female teachers is
linked to 0.89 percentage point more female students
taking and passing advanced placement exams in flat or-
ganizations; again, in other organizations the relation-
ship is essentially zero. All four differences between
the sets of slopes are statistically significant at the 0.05
level; in every case, active representative is greater in
less hierarchical organizations.
In Table 5 the relationship between high levels of
female administrators and the representation function
of female teachers is probed. The hypothesis is that a
larger number of female administrators should permit
female teachers to be more active representatives for
their female students. In every case, the slope coeffi-
cient for female teachers is larger in organizations with
more than 25% female administrators than it is in the
other organizations. In three of the four cases (the ex-
ception is ACT scores), the relationship is significant
at the .05 level (one tail test). In the ACT case, the
difference between the two coefficients barely misses
statistical significance.
Overall our findings in Tables 4 and 5 show eight of
the eight relationships to be consistent with the insti-
tutional hypotheses about representative bureaucracy
(seven of eight if one counts only statistically significant
differences). If there were no relationships between
structure and representation, the probability that we
could get eight of eight relationships in a predicted di-
rection is less than .004 (for seven or more of eight the
probability is .035).17
17 Calculated as a binomial probability distribution of eight successes
in eight trials with a probability of .5.
CONCLUSION
According to our framework, public education meets
the necessary conditions for the transfer of passive rep-
resentation to active representation for women. Con-
sistent with our theory, passive representation does
lead to active representation for gender in public
education. An increase in passive representation for
female math teachers and for female teachers in gen-
eral correlates with educational benefits for girls. The
level of passive representation for women in the bu-
reaucracy has consequences for the policy benefits the
bureaucracy produces for women. In contrast to past
research, our findings suggest that the link between pas-
sive and active representation can exist for gender, as
well as race. These findings support the assertion that
the benefits of diversity go beyond providing equal op-
portunity to individuals. Some have critiqued policies
such as affirmative action as providing benefits solely to
middle-class women (Gilliam 1995). Our findings sug-
gest, however, that increasing the diversity of bureau-
cratic organizations for sex has implications for female
clients of the bureaucracy, many of whom are not
middle-class.
Our findings also support our contention that in-
stitutional context affects whether passive represen-
tation will lead to active representation. The findings
show consistent support that stratification and hierar-
chy play an important role. In schools with more fe-
male administrators, female teachers were associated
with higher ACT, SAT, and advanced placement rates
for girls. For hierarchy, the representative process also
worked better for girls in less hierarchical organiza-
tions. Clearly, stratification and hierarchy are impor-
tant institutional variables that affect whether passive
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representation will lead to active representation. For
those seeking to increase active representation on the
basis of gender, attention must be paid to not only
increasing overall passive representation but also the
structure of the organization and the representation at
upper levels of the organization. Institutional barriers
that create glass ceilings for women have policy con-
sequences that go beyond the lack of opportunity for
individual women.
This study is the first to find that passive bureaucratic
representation translates into active representation for
women, and thus it sheds some light on an old puz-
zle, namely, why previous research has uncovered a
strong association between passive and active repre-
sentation where race is concerned but no relationship
at all where gender is the object of scrutiny. Race and
gender are of interest to students of representative
bureaucracy precisely insofar as they accrue political
meaning within institutions. While scholars in the field
have long been attentive to the ways in which race is
institutionally defined, they have been less careful in
their considerations of gender.18 Scholars who rely ex-
clusively on “sex”—that is, on data encoded according
to the binary “male/female”—without accounting for
the ways in which these designations acquire meaning
within institutions (and public life more generally) miss
precisely what it is that makes gender political. This is
to say that they miss the very factors that are likely to
move women working within bureaucracies to act to
reduce institutionalized biases against women, individ-
ually and collectively. We attribute our unique positive
results to our efforts to wed our neoinstitutional frame-
work with the insights of feminist theory. This study is,
however, only the first step in a reformulation of the
theory of representative bureaucracy and women.
To explore fully whether passive representation
leads to active representation for women in the bureau-
cracy, researchers must examine a variety of cases. We
hope that the framework presented in this analysis will
provide guidance in terms of the cases where we should
look for gender representation. Thus far, little attention
has been paid to identifying cases where, theoretically,
gender representation should occur and where it should
not. The case of education suggests that passive repre-
sentation can lead to active representation for gender.
Future research is needed, however, to verify whether
this will occur across policy areas that meet our neces-
sary conditions. Once we select cases where opportu-
nities exist for representative bureaucracy, additional
empirical tests can be conducted to determine whether
the institutional variables we have identified matter.
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